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Abstract 
With increased terrorist threats in the past few years, it is no longer feasible to feel confident that 
a facility is well protected with a static security system.  Potential adversaries often research their 
targets, examining procedural and system changes, in order to attack at a vulnerable time.  Such 
system changes may include scheduled sensor maintenance, scheduled or unscheduled changes in 
the guard force, facility alert level changes, sensor failures or degradation, etc.  All of these 
changes impact the system effectiveness and can make a facility more vulnerable.   Currently, a 
standard analysis of system effectiveness is performed approximately every six months using a 
vulnerability assessment tool called ASSESS (Analytical Systems and Software for Evaluating 
Safeguards and Systems).    New standards for determining a facility’s system effectiveness will 
be defined by tools that are currently under development, such as ATLAS (Adversary Time-line 
Analysis System) and NextGen (Next Generation Security Simulation).  Although these tools are 
useful to model analyses at different spatial resolutions and can support some sensor dynamics 
using statistical models, they are limited in that they require a static system state as input.  They 
cannot account for the dynamics of the system through day-to-day operations.  The emphasis of 
this project was to determine the feasibility of dynamically monitoring the facility security system 
and performing an analysis as changes occur.  Hence, the system effectiveness is known at all 
times, greatly assisting time-critical decisions in response to a threat or a potential threat. 
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 Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment 
1 Introduction 
With increased terrorist threats in the past few years, it is no longer feasible to feel confident that 
a facility is well protected with a static security system.  Potential adversaries often research their 
targets, examining procedural and system changes, in order to attack at a vulnerable time.  Such 
system changes may include scheduled sensor maintenance, scheduled or unscheduled changes in 
the guard force, facility alert level changes, sensor failures or degradation, etc.  All of these 
changes impact the system effectiveness and can make a facility more vulnerable.   Currently, a 
standard analysis of system effectiveness is performed approximately every six months using a 
vulnerability assessment tool called ASSESS (Analytical Systems and Software for Evaluating 
Safeguards and Systems).    New standards for determining a facility’s system effectiveness will 
be defined by tools that are currently under development, such as ATLAS (Adversary Time-line 
Analysis System) and NextGen (Next Generation Security Simulation).  Although these tools are 
useful to model analyses at different spatial resolutions and can support some sensor dynamics 
using statistical models, they are limited in that they require a static system state as input.  They 
cannot account for the dynamics of the system through day-to-day operations.  Analysis tools that 
can understand the dynamic changes that occur in a facility within the constructs of the current 
vulnerability analysis tool set are needed.  The emphasis of this project was to determine the 
feasibility of dynamically monitoring the facility security system and performing an analysis as 
changes occur.  In this sense, the system effectiveness is known at all times.  This will greatly 
enhance the response decisions that are critical during an attack or to prevent an attack.   
This work highly leveraged the capabilities in ASSESS to define elements, their safeguards, and 
their associated performance values. It also leveraged capabilities in ATLAS to obtain critical 
system performance values.  A software simulation was developed as a proof-of-concept to 
demonstrate the capability of providing a continual analysis of system effectiveness on a 
dynamically changing security system.  A description of facility information used from ASSESS 
and ATLAS is provided in Section 2.  Section 3 describes the overall software architecture of the 
Dynamic Vulnerability Analysis (DVA) simulation. A description of the operation of the 
simulation is presented in Section 4.  The project is summarized in Section 5. 
2 Background 
A key component of performing a vulnerability analysis on a facility is a description of its 
physical security system.  The facility information is defined using an Adversary Sequence 
Diagram (ASD), which is a schematic representation of a facility and its safeguards components 
(See Figure 1).  Each area of the facility that separates the offsite area with the target area is 
represented by a horizontal bar.  Path elements are the portals that connect the areas.  A path 
element exists for each possible access method into and out of the area.  Types of path elements 
include door (DOR), personnel portal (PER), vehicle portal (VEH), gate (GAT), fence (FEN), 
surface (SUR), duct (DUC), shipping door (SHP), emergency exit (EMX), etc. 
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Figure 1. Adversary Sequence Diagram with areas and path elements defined. 
Each path element has certain characteristics (Alarm Assessment, SNM Sweep, Traffic Flow, 
Background Radiation, and Material Container) that are addressed by a set of safeguards.  The 
safeguards define the security at the associated path element.  There are seven categories of 
safeguards: Access Control, Contraband Detection, SNM Detection, Material Transfer Control, 
Intrusion Detection, Access Delay, and Security Inspectors.  Each element may have a different 
set of possible safeguards for each category.  The data that describes the security system of the 
facility is saved in a file.  This is the baseline description of the safeguards that are used for 
dynamic vulnerability assessment. 
Performance characteristics are defined for each safeguard.  These may change depending on the 
threat that is being addressed.  The performance values are used to statistically determine critical 
paths to the target and the probability of interruption of the intruder (PI) under different threat 
conditions. 
3 DVA Software Architecture 
A proof-of-concept software simulation was developed to perform vulnerability analysis 
dynamically on a facility security system.  The main goals of the project were to (1) automatically 
detect changes in safeguards, which may affect the system effectiveness, (2) analyze a changing 
system over a period of time so that at any time during that period, the system effectiveness is 
known, and (3) provide a visualization tool for an operator showing critical paths to the target that 
are updated as the system effectiveness changes.  A high level design of the simulation system is 
shown in Figure 2.  DVA Monitor is a process that receives status information about the system.  
This includes the status of safeguards, the current guard force schedule, scheduled maintenance, 
on or off hour operation, etc.  DVA Response is a process that reads the DVA results and displays 
the information to an operator.   
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Figure 2. High level DVA System Architecture 
The DVA Monitor process runs on a separate machine that is capable of receiving inputs from all 
sensors as well as mouse or keyboard input regarding schedule information.  Schedule 
information may include times of day and night operations, guard schedule, guard absences, 
maintenance schedules, item movement schedules, and any other type of information that may 
affect the performance characteristics of the physical security system components.  The sensors 
provide operational status information (i.e., on/off or working/not working).  A degradation factor 
would also be applied to sensors.  This may be based on the expected life of a sensor or by 
monitoring the strength of a sensor signal.  If a sensor fails, its degradation factor is 100 percent.  
A clock input is provided in order to make automatic configuration changes of the physical 
security system at scheduled times and to perform a vulnerability analysis on the system at 
scheduled times.  VA algorithms are called from this process.  These algorithms are the same as 
those used with standard VA tools such as ASSESS or ATLAS.  The databases used in these 
tools are also accessible on a dynamic basis.  Whenever changes to the security system occur, the 
VA results are updated.  They are saved in a file and are then sent to the DVA Response process 
for display. 
The DVA Response process provides an interface between an alarm station operator and the 
dynamically changing vulnerability analysis results.  The DVA information provided to the 
operator would help in quickly identifying weaknesses in the physical security system and would 
provide a key role in making decisions regarding guard placement or counter-attack strategies.  
Vulnerability analysis algorithms provide a substantial suite of information regarding the critical 
paths to a target and the probability of interruption (PI) of the adversary assuming various 
response force times.  The critical paths and their associated PIs are displayed for the user.  Other 
VA results are available for presentation to the operator if needed. 
4 DVA Proof-of-Concept Operation 
The Monitor process is initialized with a facility Physical Security System (.pps) file (Figure 3).  
This file contains all the information regarding the possible path elements and their associated 
safeguards for the selected facility.  This file is created when an analysis is first done on a facility 
(See Section 2).  The initial .pps file provides a baseline for future analysis and is used to 
establish the initial status of the DVA system when it is first initialized.  The failure or 
degradation of safeguards is accounted for in the DVA Monitor process, but the baseline .pps file 
is not changed. 
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Figure 3. Selection of a Physical Protection System file for a facility. 
Once the system is initialized with the appropriate .pps file, monitoring of the facility security 
status begins.  A new vulnerability analysis can be run at any time on the facility by selecting the 
Run Analysis button on the user interface.  For this simulation, the operational state of safeguards 
is manually changed using mouse input from menu selections.  For example, in Figure 4, the 
MAA Portal element is selected from the Protected Area.   
 
Figure 4. Selecting a path element that is defined for the facility. 
Once the element is selected, the safeguards that are available for that element are listed, as 
shown in Figure 5.  The individual safeguards can be turned on or off by checking or un-checking 
the box in front of each.  Degradation can also be applied by highlighting an individual safeguard 
and using the slider to indicate the percentage of operational value for that safeguard.  In the 
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 example shown in the figure, the Portal Metal Detector is deactivated (failed).  The ID Actuat
Lock 1 is set to 70% operational (a degradation of 30%).  When a change is applied that affects 
the system effectiveness, the VA algorithms are executed. 
ed 
A continual timeline can also be set up for the DVA Monitor for simulation purposes (See Figure 
rios 
Figure 6. DVA of a facility over a continual time period. 
 
Figure 5. Manually changing operational status of element safeguards. 
6).  Each bar along the timeline represents a selected period of time (e.g., 1 hour).  During the 
progress of the timeline, the operational state of the physical security system is monitored.  
During this time, safeguards can be modified as described earlier, different monitoring scena
can be applied (e.g., daytime vs. nighttime operation, movement of assets, etc), and different 
guard schedules can be applied.  Whenever a change to the security system is made that may 
affect the system effectiveness, a new VA is automatically performed. 
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 In ASSESS, there are only two conditions that are used (usually relating to daytime and nighttime 
operations).  Each condition may have a different set of safeguards with different performance 
values.  In this DVA project, multiple conditions can be added and different ones can be effective 
at different times.  A “sequence” may be selected, which refers to a predefined order of events 
(scenario) over a given time sequence.  For example, the time begins at 8:00am with a full guard 
force and daytime conditions.  At 10:00, several guards leave, resulting in a reduced guard force.  
At 2:00, a scheduled maintenance takes place, removing several of the sensors from the security 
system.  At 4:00 the maintenance should be complete and the sensors are expected to be back on-
line.  At 5:00, an off-hours security condition takes effect.  Currently, there are two sequences of 
events that are possible, called Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.  The application of different sequences 
during a given timeline can be selected as shown in Figure 7.  More sequences can easily be 
added as needed for simulation purposes.  Also, the selection of a full or reduced size guard force 
can be made during a given timeline (Figure 8).  This capability could be extended to indicate the 
exact number of guards.  This information affects the performance values of different safeguards 
and also assists the guard force in placing personnel as needed throughout the facility.  
Figure 8. Schedule selection. 
The DVA Response process executes on a separate machine, possibly the Alarm, 
Communications, and Display (AC&D) system.  This provides the operator with a visual display 
of VA results.  The communications line from the DVA Monitor Process is continually polled for 
updated analysis results.  When new results are available, the DVA Response operator is notified 
and can refresh the display with the new information.  The DVA Response process provides 
information that would allow the guard force to be aware of the most critical paths through the 
facility at all times.  This would grea  of guards and in strategy decisions 
made during an actual attack. 
Here, an ASD is 
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Figure 7. Sequence selection. 
 
 
 
tly assist in the placement
The operator interface for the proof-of-concept simulation is shown in Figure 9.  
provided as well as a map of the facility.  Each time new data is available, the 
button turns red.  When pressed, the screen is updated with the most critical path
facility with the shortest response force time.  The operator can observe up to ten critical paths 
that are associated with up to 10 different response force times.  The num
the response force times available is determined apriori, when the facility file is fi
an analysis profile is determined. 
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Figure 9. DVA Operator Interface. 
In this display, a single high-level map is used to highlight elements in the critical path.  
Potentially, several layers of maps could be used in order to display path elements, and even 
safeguards, within buildings and rooms.  The level of sophistication of the display would depend 
on map availability. 
5 Summary 
A need exists to determine the security system effectiveness of a facility on a dynamic basis.  
Although vulnerability analysis is generally performed bi-annually on a system, the system 
effectiveness changes continually.  This may be due to sensor failures, degradation of sensors 
over time, removal or replacement of certain safeguards, guard shift changes, unexpected 
absences of members of the guard force, maintenance schedules, etc.  When changes are made to 
the physical protection system, a new VA is executed, providing immediate results that could 
greatly influence the placement or movement of security forces and/or assets.  A proof-of-concept 
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 simulation of a system that could detect changes in the security system and automatically produce 
new VA results was developed for this project.  This required accessing and manipulating data 
files and performance values that are created or maintained by existing VA tools in order to 
produce results on an as-needed basis.  The analysis algorithms used in this simulation were from 
the “Outsider Analysis” tools in ASSESS.  As long as the data is accessible, algorithms from 
ATLAS or NEXTGEN could also be used.  The simulation shows that system effectiveness could 
be updated dynamically as system changes occur.   
Follow-on work that would be beneficial to the concept of dynamic vulnerability analysis is to 
deploy the DVA Monitor and DVA Response processes in a real facility environment that uses 
the standard set of VA tools.   
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